All Shahs Men American Middle


All Shahs Men American Middle

With a thrilling narrative that sheds much light on recent events, this national bestseller brings to life the 1953 CIA coup in Iran that ousted the country’s elected prime minister, ushered in a quarter-century of brutal rule beneath the Shah, and stimulated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Selected as one of the best books of the year by the Washington Post and The Economist, it now features a new preface by the author on the folly of attacking Iran.

From Publishers WeeklyWith breezy storytelling and diligent research, Kinzer has reconstructed the CIA’s 1953 overthrow of the elected leader of Iran, Mohammad Mossadegh, who was wildly standard at home for having nationalized his country’s oil industry. The coup ushered in the long and brutal dictatorship of Mohammad Reza Shah, widely seen as a U.S. puppet and himself overthrown by the Islamic revolution of 1979. At it is best this work reads like a spy novel, with code names and informants, midnight meetings with the monarch and a last-minute plot twist when the CIA’s plan, called Operation Ajax, closely goes awry. A veteran New York Times alien correspondent and the author of books on Nicaragua (Blood of Brothers) and Turkey (Crescent and Star), Kinzer has combed memoirs, academic works, government documents and news stories to formulate this blow-by-blow account. He shows that until early in 1953, Great Britain and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were the imperialist baddies of this tale. Intransigent in the face of Iran’s demands for a fairer portion of oil profits and better conditions for workers, British Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison exacerbated tension with his attitude that the challenge from Iran was, in Kinzer’s words, “a simple matter of ignorant natives rebelling versus the forces of civilization.” Before the crisis peaked, a high-ranking employee of Anglo-Iranian wrote to a superior that the company’s confederacy with the “corrupt ruling classes” and “leech-like bureaucracies” were “disastrous, outdated and impractical.” This stands as a textbook lesson in how not to conduct alien policy.
Copyright 2003 Reed Business Information, Inc.

ReviewThat the past is prolog is peculiarly unfeigned in this astonishing account of the 1953 overthrow of nationalist Iranian leader Mohammed Mossadegh, who became prime minister in 1951 and without delay nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This act angered the British, who sought assistance from the United States in overthrowing Mossedegh’s fledgling democracy. Kermit Roosevelt, Teddy’s grandson, led the successful coup in August 1953, which ended in the reestablishment of the Iranian monarchy in the person of Mohammad Reza Shah. Iranian anger at this alien intrusion smoldered until the 1979 revolution. Meanwhile, over the next decade, the United States with great success overthrew other governments, such as that of Guatemala. Kinzer, a New York Times correspondent who has likewise written regarding the 1954 Guatemala coup (Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala), tells his captivating tale with style and verve. This book leads one to wonder how a great deal of of our contemporary troubles in the Middle East may have resulted from this covert CIA adventure. Recommended for all collections. —Ed Goedeken, Iowa S tate Univ. Lib., Ames (Library Journal, June 15, 2003)

“…He does so with a keen journalistic eye, and with a novelist’s pen…In what is a very gripping read.” (The New York Times, July 23, 2003)

Tell humans today that the United Nations was once the center of the world—the place where engaged in a struggle nations got a shot at a reasonable hearing rather of a monkey trial before they were overthrown—and most would in all probability shake their heads in puzzlement.
Yet it was at the U.N., in October 1953, that one of the biggest dramas of the nascent television age unfolded: The eccentric, hawk-nosed Iranian nationalist leader Mohammed Mossadegh squared off with the aristocratic ambassador of the fading British Empire. At stake was Britain’s assert to own Iran’s oil in perpetuity.
The press played the showdown like a prize fight, “the tremulous, crotchety Premier versus Britain’s super-suave representative, Sir Gladwyn Jebb,” in Newsweek’s account. The Daily News groused, “Whether Mossy is a bogus or a authenti tear-jerker, he better put everything he’s got into his show if he goes on television here.” Time magazine had made him it is Man of the Year. Now came “the decisive act in the dramatic, tragic and now and then absurd drama that started out when Iran nationalized the Anglo-American Oil Co. five months ago.”
Five centuries ago would be more accurate, in the eyes of veteran New York Times correspondent Stephen Kinzer, who has written an completely engrossing, often riveting, almost Homeric tale, which, if life were fair, would be this summer’s beach book. For anybody with more than a passing interest in how the United States got into such a pickle in the Middle East, All the Shah’s Men is as good as Grisham.
And what a reputation Mossadegh makes: a fiery, French-educated nationalist with wild eyes, a high patrician forehead and droopy cheeks. His legendary hypochondria—he was prone to fainting and perpetually received even diplomatic visitors in bed—seemed to flow from some deep wellspring of Shi’ite martyrdom, Kinzer suggests.
But the author’s real accomplishment is his suspenseful account of Persia’s centuries-old military, political, cultural and religious heritage, in which Mossadegh’s face-off with London comes as the stirring climax to a drama that begun with “Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes, titans whose names still echo through history.” By the 1930s, most Iranians had come to regard the abject misery they plunged into with each passing decade of exclusive British control of their one great natural asset as another passing calamity in a long history of the same. But with the global stirring of post-World War II nationalism, Anglo-American Oil pushed them to the breaking point.
In 1947, for example, the company reported an after-tax earnings of £40 million—the equivalent of $112 million—and gave Iran just £7 million,” Kinzer writes. Meanwhile, the company ignored a 1933 agreement to recompense workers more than 50 cents a day, or to build “the schools, hospitals, roads, or telephone scheme it promised.” Inevitably, riots started out breaking out at Abadan, the oil city where hundreds of thousands of Iranians lived amidst baked mud and sewage in cardboard hovels in shadeless, searing heat. Their British overseers lived in another world entirely—tending to their green lawns and gardens, looking at their well-scrubbed children frolic in the fountains, attending air-conditioned, “no-wogs-allowed” movie theaters, and sipping gin and tonics in their private clubs. The Abadan riots also propelled the fiery Mossadegh to his rendevous with destiny. But altho the Iranian leader held his audience at the United Nations Security Council with a moving explication of his country’s destitution at the hands of Anglo-Iranian interests, his triumph proved short-lived—and was soon to become a bittersweet memory.
In 1953, President Harry S Truman, whose gut-level sympathy for the impoverished Iranians led him to rebuff British pleas to conspire in Mossadegh’s removal, was gone. The incoming Republicans were much more favorably disposed toward the British, peculiarly after Whitehall repackaged it is pitch in terms of a communist threat: Iran would fall to the Soviets, they now said, if Mossadegh stayed in office. Within weeks, the Eisenhower administration was plotting to get rid of him.
After all this drama, the machinations of CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt in Teheran to fetch down Mossadegh and replace him with the young Reza Shah Pahlevi seems almost like an epilogue. For connoisseurs of covert action, however, there’s a hell of a story left, even if numerous of it will make even the hardest-bitten Cold Warrior wince.
The basic facts of Operation Ajax have been known for a lot of time, in portion from “Kim” Roosevelt’s own memoir, in portion from other sources, most notably a windfall of long-classified CIA documents leaked to Kinzer’s New York Times colleague James Risen in 2000.
The author makes good use of the material, toggling his drama amidst Washington, where CIA desk officers furiously churned out material for bought-off Iranian newsprints and radio stations, to Teheran, where Roosevelt scurried amongst clandestine meetings with Reza Pahlevi—a man so timorous he flew to Baghdad when the plot seemed to unravel—as well as with respective treasonous Iranian Army officers.
Ajax was a triumph in the eyes of many—especially, needless to say, in the CIA. That verdict, of course, discounts the whirlwind of 1979, when the Shah was overthrown by furious Shi’ite mobs whipped up by the Ayatollah Khomeini, who speedily spawned the terrorists of Hezbollah and other groups who plague us today.
“We got 25 years out of the Shah—that’s not so bad,” a CIA man once said to me, stirring a drink with his finger. As always, the Iranians had a dissimilar view. —Jeff Stein is co-author of “Saddam’s Bombmaker” and editor of Congressional Quarterly’s Homeland Security, a each and everyday news Web site. (The Washington Post, Sunday, August 3, 2003)

On Aug. 15, 1953, a. group of anxious C.I.A. officers huddled in a safe house in Tehran, sloshing down vodka, singing Broadway songs and waiting to listen whether they’d made history. Their favored tune, “Luck Be a Lady Tonight,” became the unofficial anthem of Operation Ajax – the American plot to oust Iran’s nationalist prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, and place the country with resolute determination in the authoritarian hands of Mohammed Reza Shah.
In fact, luck was not much of a lady that night; as Stephen Kinzer’s lively general history of the 1953 coup recounts, Mossadegh’s chief of staff got word of the conspiracy and rushed troops to defend the prime minister, thereby panicking the feckless young shah into fleeing to Baghdad and plunging the carousing Central Intelligence agents into gloom. The coup succeeded four tense days later, only after a C.I.A.-incited mob (led by a giant thug known memorably as Shaban the Brainless) swept Mossadegh aside. Luck was even less kind to the Ajax plotters in the longer haul; in 1979, the despotic shah fell to Islamist revolutionaries bristling with anti-American resentment.
Even the president who approved the coup, Dwight Eisenhower, later described it as seeming “more like a dime novel than an historical fact.” Sure enough, “All the Shah’s Men” reads more like a swashbuckling yarn than a scholarly opus. Still, Kinzer, a New York Times correspondent now based in Chicago, offers a helpful reminder of an oft-neglected piece of Middle Eastern history, drawn in part from a lately revealed mystery C.I.A. history.
The book’s hero is the enigmatic Mossadegh himself. In his day, British newsprints likened Mossadegh to Robespierre and Frankenstein’s monster, while The New York Times equated him to Jefferson and Paine. Kinzer full-throatedly takes the latter view, seeing Mossadegh’s accomplishments as “profound and even earth-shattering.” But he acknowledges that the great Iranian nationalist was likewise an oddball: a prima donna, prone to hypochondria, ulcers and fits, who met the urbane American diplomat Averell Harriman while lying in bed in pink pajamas and a camel-hair cloak.
Mossadegh’s Iran faced formidable foes: British oil executives, the C.I.A. and the brothers Dulles, all of whom come off wretchedly here. The least sympathetic of all are Iran’s erstwhile British rulers, who continued to gouge Iran thru the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. When the Truman administration prodded it to portion the wealth with Iran, it is chairman sniffed, “One penny more and the company goes broke.” In 1951, to London’s fury, Mossadegh led a successful effort to nationalize the oil company, drove the British to close their critical oil refinery at Abadan and became prime minister. The British started out drafting invasion plans, but Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson cautioned them that gunboat diplomacy would hurt the West in it is struggle with Moscow.
Truman and Acheson’s successors, alas, were less restrained. Third-world natio…

“astonishing account…Kinzer, a New York Times correspondent…tells his captivating tale with style and verve”. (Library Journal, June 15, 2003)

“…He does so with a keen journalistic eye, and with a novelist’s pen…In what is a very gripping read.” (The New York Times, July 23, 2003)

“…Kinze who has written an totally engrossing, many times riveting, closely Homeric tale, which, if life were fair, would be this summer’s beach book.” (The Washington Post, Sunday, August 3, 2003)

“…lively general history…brisk, bright account…. Kinzer…offers a helpful reminder of an oft-neglected piece of Middle Eastern history”. (The New York Time Book Review, August 10, 2003)

“…For those who like their spy data raw, the CIA’s mystery history is now freely available, thanks to a leek…” (Economist, 15 August 2003)

“a thrilling tale that pits two characters worthy of a movie versus each other.” (Economist, August 16, 2003)

“entertaining and now and again shocking…serves as a utile reminder that troublesome regimes do not come out of nowhere.” (Business Week, Aug. 18-25, 2003)

“…Kinzer’s book offers a cautionary tale for our current leaders…not all such changes go according to plan…” (The Scotsman, 16 August 2003)

“…a new book in regards to the coup All the Shah’s men…recalls a good deal of unwelcome parallels(with the Gulf War)…”(The Guardian, 20 August 2003)

“…a topical subject with an explanation…” (Greenock Telegraph, 29 October 2003)

“…provides an capable and ofttimes bright summary of our knowledge…” (BBC History Magazine, December 2003)

“…an astonishing achievement, a adventure story backed by meticulous research, a political analysis in artful prose…” (Irish Times, 25 December 2003)

“this skilled correspondent and analyst writes this so efficaciously is one of the a lot of reasons why this incisive critique is so applicable today.” (Ray Locker of the Associated Press)

From the Inside FlapHalf a century ago, the United States overthrew a Middle Eastern government for the primary time. The victim was Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran. Although the coup seemed a success at first, today it serves as a chilling lesson when it comes to the dangers of alien intervention.

In this book, veteran New York Times correspondent Stephen Kinzer gives the firstborn full account of this fateful operation. His account is centered around an hour-by-hour reconstruction of the events of August 1953, and concludes with an assessment of the coup’s “haunting and terrible legacy.”

Operation Ajax, as the plot was code-named, reshaped the history of Iran, the Middle East, and the world. It restored Mohammad Reza Shah to the Peacock Throne, permitting him to impose a tyranny that in the end sparked the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Islamic Revolution, in turn, inspired fundamentalists allround the Muslim world, including the Taliban and terrorists who thrived underneath it is protection.

“It is not far-fetched,” Kinzer asserts in this book, “to draw a line from Operation Ajax through the Shah’s repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York.”

Drawing on exploration in the United States and Iran, and using material from a long-secret CIA report, Kinzer explains the background of the coup and tells how it was carried out. It is a cloak-and-dagger story of spies, saboteurs, and mystery agents. There are accounts of bribes, staged riots, suitcases full of cash, and midnight meetings amongst the Shah and CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt, who was smuggled in and out of the royal palace under a blanket in the back seat of a car. Roosevelt, the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, was a real-life James Bond in an era when CIA agents operated primarily by their wits. After his original coup try failed, he coordinated a second try that succeeded three days later.

The colorful cast of characters includes the terrified young Shah, who fled his country at the basi sign of trouble; General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, father of the Gulf War commander and the radio voice of “Gang Busters,” who flew to Tehran on a mystery mission that helped set the coup in motion; and the fiery Prime Minister Mossadegh, who outraged the West by nationalizing the immensely profitable Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The British, outraged by the seizure of their oil company, persuaded President Dwight Eisenhower that Mossadegh was leading Iran toward Communism. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain became the coup’s main sponsors.

Brimming with perceptivities into Middle Eastern history and American alien policy, this book is an eye-opening look at an event whose unintended consequences–Islamic revolution and violent anti-Americanism–have shaped the modern world. As the United States assumes an ever-widening role in the Middle East, it is necessary reading.

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Most helpful client reviews

90 of 98 humans found the following review helpful.
4British intransigence, American obtuseness
By N. Tsafos
It is inconceivable to read this book without sentiment sympathy for the Iranians and their leader, Mossadegh Mohammad, for whom Stephen Kinzer has special affection, and without formulating a sense of distaste firstborn at the British, and then at their accomplices, the Americans. All the same, it is likewise out of the question not to cast a doubt on the book’s main conclusion-that the US-led coup in Iran in 1953 lies at the root of Middle East terror.

Stephen Kinzer, a veteran reporter for the New York Times, is no stranger to American coups, having contributed to the writing of the history of the CIA coup in Guatemala in 1954. In “All the Shah’s Men,” Mr. Kinzer chronicles another coup, one that preceded Guatemala and laid the foundation for America’s thinking that coups may be a utile and effective tool of alien policy.

The book narrates the history of alien involvement in Iran that culminated in the toppling of Mossadegh Mohammad and the re-coronation of Reza Shah as Iran’s leader. Mr. Kinzer goes back centuries to choreograph the details of alien involvement in Iranian politics, and pay peculiar attention to the last century and a half: in 1872, for example, Nasir al-Din Shah offered a most sweeping concession to Baron Julius de Reuter to, amid others, exploit Iran’s natural resources, a privilege revoked a year later. After that came other concessions, extended and then revoked, accorded and then renegotiated, on oil and other business.

What made the landscape explosive was the resignation, in 1941, of Reza Shah, Iran’s king, and the subsequent emergence of Mossadegh, and a person who rested much of his political fortune on the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Corporation (in 1951). His ardent faith that his country had been exploited by the British, and his unwillingness to compromise, coupled with the intransigence of the British produced a perfective setting for confrontation.

Perfect, yes. But not inevitable. For that, one has to credit the re-election of Winston Churchill, an passionate Empire enthusiast, who was much keener on resolving the dispute amidst Iran and the AIOC, by strength if necessary, than was his predecessor. Equally crucial was the election of Dwight Eisenhower, who substituted the skeptical and sympathetic to Iran Harry Truman, and adopted a more selfasserting pro-British line (courtesy of the Dulles brothers, Allen and John Foster, who ran the CIA and State Department, and who dire Iran might turn communist).

The narrative is eloquent, with sufficient attention on detail as to offer a bright account of what happened and why. Mr. Kinzer has an eye for drama, building up the sequence of events with a novel-like quality (including the details of the coup, and Mossadegh’s visit to the USA and UN). No doubt, the reader will feel rather conversant on the details of the alien involvement in Iran leading up to the 1953 coup.

What is less obvious, however, is Mr. Kinzer grand conclusion: “It is not far-fetched,” he writes, “to draw a line from Operation Ajax [the coup codename] through the Shah’s repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York.” As a history book, “All the Shah’s” has a good deal of attractions; and, no doubt, there are lessons in 1953 to be learned today with regards to meddling in other countries’ businesses. But to link the 1953 with September 11 feels more like authoring overstretched, and ought to be best left at that.

35 of 39 humans found the following review helpful.
5Essential reading for understanding US relations with Iran
By Arthur Amchan
This is a short and very readable account of the American sponsored coup that overthrew the Iranian government of Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. I commend this book for a potpourri of reasons. First, it briefly surmise Iranian history in a way that readers without a lot of background may absorb. Secondly, Kinzer tells the story of the coup without loading the reader down with so much detail that the necessities of the story are obscured. Thirdly, while Kinzer without doubt or question blames the British, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Eisenhower Administration for making a short-sighted decision, he acknowledges that there is no way to disprove the justification for the coup, i.e., that it was necessary to prevent a Soviet takeover of Iran. As an aside, Harry Truman comes off looking very wise in resisting pressure from Britain to help the coup; a decision the Eisenhower Administration reversed.

48 of 55 people found the following review helpful.
5Please portion this eye-opening book by gifting it to someone
By A
This book is my favored over the last 2 years, and I read more than 50 books each year (about one book per week). My only complaint is that the title of the book will have to have cited Mossadegh….something like, “The Story of Mossadegh: How the British and the CIA Destroyed a Great Soul and a Great Nation.” All the Shah’s Men are not crucial – history will forget them, at most in a few decades. Mossadegh’s legend will grow with time, just like those of Socrates or Mother Teresa. Mossadegh was to the Iranians, what Gandhi was to Indians, or what Martin Luther King was to the African Americans. Its just a matter of time – the current Islamic govt. in Iran is too affrighted of the democratic ideals that Mossadegh represented. Sooner or later Mossadegh will occupy the place in history that he rightfully deserves – there will be a lot of more books, movies, and who knows even future revolutions inspired by him.

Many thanks to Stephen Kinzer for publishing an exact account of how Churchill’s and Eisenhower’s short term oil interests and communophobia ruined a budding democracy in a great historical land. Note that the book was just published in 2003 and a lot of material was inaccessible until very recently.

Iran or Persia was home to Rumi, the outstanding sufi mystic, and Zoroaster, the outstanding spiritual teacher. Iranians are moderate people, representing the best values of Islam. Yet, a typical American’s assessment of Iranians is that they are fanatic zealots and hate the whole western culture. And may be there is galore truth to that. But have you ever wondered why Iranians became so disgusted and distrustful of the Americans and the British. Read this book. Whatever you may think of America or Britain, it will for a limitless time modify you assessment of the evil roles played by the governments of these two countries (only the governments, not the humans of these countries, of course).

Also, if your heart has ever cried thinking regarding the 9/11 tragedies, then your answers will be eternally not complete if you do not commence to understand the powerful forces of hate unleashed by CIA and Churchill in the 1953 coup when they got rid of a democratically elected, liberal minded leader named Mossadegh in favor of British oil interests. Mossadegh inspired millions of Iranians, just like Thomas Jefferson inspired millions of Americans. By implanting Shah as the cruel dictator and removing Mossadegh (the democratically elected Prime Minister), the CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt everlastingly changed Middle eastern politics. Consider for a moment what would have happnened if the British had implanted a cruel dictator like Fidel Castro in the U.S. in 1776 and imprisoned the founding fathers of U.S.

If you have taken the trouble to read numerous of these reviews – buy this book, it is the most important book on why we are where we are today. A sobering realization of who is in truth behind the world that we have inherited today. You determine that after reading the book!

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